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I. INTRODUCTION
We all think we are the foremost authority when it comes to our personal health.
We are consciously selective in what we tell our doctors, we confidently use
WedMD.com to self-diagnose illnesses, and we even think we are savvy enough to
*
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make the medical determination of whether we should receive a flu shot each fall.
We feel assured knowing that no one knows or can alter our medical identity without
our consent or at least our knowledge. But what if someone can?
In 2009, Brandon Sharp, a 37-year-old manager at an oil and gas company in
Houston, Texas,1 was creating his version of the American dream. He was about to
get married, buy his first home, and was in perfect physical condition.2 Before
applying for a mortgage, Mr. Sharp requested a copy of his credit report.3 Much to
his chagrin, his credit report revealed several collection notices under his name for
emergency room visits throughout the country and a $19,000 bill for a life flight
service.4
Mr. Sharp, like an increasing number of Americans, had fallen victim to a crime
known as medical identity theft. The crime, defined as the theft or unauthorized use
of another’s personal information to obtain medical goods and services,5 is
dangerous because it alters the victim’s medical identity without the victim’s
knowledge and may never be detected.6 Additionally, because there is no national
centralized repository for medical records, every time a thief uses the victim’s
medical identity, a record is created that could be easily mistaken for the victim’s
medical record.7
This note explains the severity of medical identity theft and the state and federal
legislative reactions to the problem. Specifically, the note discusses data breach
notification statutes that require healthcare providers to notify consumers when the
systems holding customer personal information are breached.8 The note concludes
that Ohio’s data breach notification statute, which does not expressly cover
healthcare providers,9 should be amended to protect residents from medical identity
theft and provide redress when healthcare providers10 violate state law.

1
Walecia Konrad, Medical Problems Could Include Identity Theft, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/13/health/13patient.html.
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Pat Curry, How to Prevent and Cure Medical ID Theft, CREDITCARDS.COM (Dec.
29, 2008), http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/how-to-prevent-medical-id-identitytheft-1282.php.
6

Id. Generally a victim will never know he is a victim of medical identity theft, unless
he receives notice of an unpaid medical bill for treatment he has never received. See id.
7

See id.

8

See Sasha Romanosky et. Al., Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity
Theft?, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., at 1 (May 2008),
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/research/241full.pdf.
9

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19(F)(2) (LexisNexis 2010). See also Department of
Health and Human Services General Administrative Requirements, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103
(2010).
10

For purposes of this note, the term “healthcare providers” will be used interchangeably
with the term “HIPAA Covered Entities.”
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Section II of this note describes the nationwide problem of medical identity theft.
It begins with an overview of data breach and general identity theft. The section then
explains the difference between general identity theft and medical identity theft, and
why the latter is more harmful to the victim.
Section III illustrates the federal legislative response to data breaches in the
healthcare industry. The section also explains how all healthcare providers are
subject to the requirements of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (hereinafter “HIPAA”). The section explains the Act’s 2009
amendments, known as the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Act. Lastly, the third section illustrates the interaction between state and
federal law, and how federal legislation allows for state regulations regarding data
breaches.
Section IV provides an overview of the current Ohio law on data breach
notification. The section articulates how and when the Ohio law applies. And most
importantly, it explains that Ohio’s data breach notification statute does not apply to
healthcare providers.
Lastly, Section V provides several suggestions that will ensure Ohio is better able
to protect its residents from medical identity theft through an amended data breach
notification statute. Specifically, the section offers four proposals: (1) Ohio should
make its data breach laws applicable to healthcare providers; (2) healthcare providers
doing business in Ohio should not have any discretion when it comes to notifying
patients when their data systems have been breached; (3) Ohio’s data breach
legislation should require healthcare providers to destroy patient’s personal
information when they dispose of it; and (4) Ohio’s legislation should provide a
mechanism for victims of medical identity theft to have access to monetary penalties
from healthcare providers who violate the amended state law.
While it is undisputed that medical identity theft is a fast growing and fairly
complex crime, there is no justifiable reason why Ohio should punt its ability to
protect Ohio residents from medical identity theft to the federal government. As this
note dictates, there are several concerns that favor and disfavor state laws that
address consumer protection from medical identity theft. After weighing these
concerns, however, the state legislature should be a driving force rather than a
complacent participant in the fight against medical identity theft.
II. DATA BREACH, IDENTITY THEFT, AND MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT
There are three actions that involve the unauthorized acquisition or misuse of an
individual’s personal information that may harm an individual. The first is the breach
of an organization’s information storage system containing consumer data. The
second is identity theft. The third is a more severe form of identity theft known as
medical identity theft. This section distinguishes the three actions and further
explains the severe effects of medical identity theft.
A. Data Breach
The heart of data breach is personal information. In general terms, personal
information is any data that identifies a particular person.11 Organizations collect
11

See Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal
Identifying Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 91, 93 (2009). This includes social security numbers, mothers’ maiden names,
employment addresses, home addresses, and other personally identifiable information. See id.
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this personal information because it creates an efficient way to provide goods and
services.12 At the same time, this collection creates a prime target for identity
thieves.13
The unauthorized acquisition of, or access to, records containing an individual’s
personal information constitutes a security breach. 14 Often times, data breaches
result in unauthorized access to only a small number of records. For example, in
2008, a 38-year-old Avon Lake, Ohio man spent a measly $115 for a spyware
program that enabled him to view details of medical procedures, diagnostic notes,
and other confidential information of 62 hospital patients.15 Data breaches can also
result in access to an enormous amount of personal information. For example, a
laptop containing the social security numbers of approximately 2,000 current and
former school employees from Springfield City Schools in Ohio was stolen from a
state auditor’s car, which was parked in his home garage.16
Just as data breaches can occur in numerous sizes, they also occur in several
forms. For instance, hackers can use the Internet illegally to retrieve information
stored in computer systems.17 Individuals can also physically steal computers, data
storage equipment, and paper files.18 Additionally, personal information can be
improperly displayed or thrown away, allowing sensitive data to be viewed by those
who should not have access.19 And finally, a disgruntled or opportunistic employee
may also be the source of data breach.20
12

See id. at 95.

13

See id. Since 2005, over 345 million records containing personal information have been
involved in security breaches in the United States. See Chronology of Data Breaches,
PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach (last
updated Sept. 6, 2010).
14
See Neal G. Walters, Into the Breach: Security Breaches and Identity Theft, AARP
PUB. POLICY INST. (July 2006), http://www.aarp.org/technology/privacy-security/info2006/dd142_security_breach.html.
15

See Robert McMillan, Misdirected Spyware Infects Ohio Hospital, PCWORLD (Sept.
17, 2009),
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/172185/misdirected_spyware_infects_ohio_h
ospital.html. The spyware gave the man access to the information when the person he sent the
software to opened it on a hospital computer. See id. “He was also able to obtain e-mail and
financial records of four…hospital employees.” Id.
16

See Andrew McGinn, Laptop with City School Employees’ Information Stolen,
SPRINGFIELD NEWS-SUN (Mar. 16, 2007),
http://www.springfieldnewssun.com/hp/content/oh/story/news/local/2007/03/16/sns031707lap
top.html.
17

See Walters, supra note 14.

18

Id.

19

See id. [F]or example, printing Social Security numbers on address labels, inadvertently
making sensitive personal information accessible on Internet sites that can be viewed by the
general public, or not properly disposing of files containing sensitive personal information.”
Id.
20

See Jonathan J. Darrow & Stephen D. Lichtenstein, “Do You Really Need My Social
Security Number?” Data Collection Practices in the Digital Age, 10 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 1,
15-16 (2008).
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When a data breach occurs, it can be costly to the individual whose information
has been compromised, as well as to the company that had its data system
breached.21 The individual may have to monitor his credit for years, if not a
lifetime.22 The organization, in many cases, must bear the cost of notifying the
individuals whose information has been stolen. When a publically traded company is
involved, there is a significant, negative effect on the company’s stock price. 23 The
company may also be liable for damages if a customer brings a successful civil
action based on common law principles or violations of federal and state data breach
notification statutes.24 Even if the suit is unsuccessful, the litigation cost alone can be
an unexpected and substantial expenditure. Overall, a data breach’s effect can be
considerable, but in many cases it is just the tip of the iceberg.
B. Identity Theft
While data breaches pose a serious threat to the privacy of personal information,
most people fear what happens after a data breach has occurred. A data breach
exposes personal information that is lawfully used by many organizations to open
new accounts, verify information, and make changes to existing accounts. Identity
theft occurs when an individual uses another person’s identifying information,
without permission, to commit fraud or other crimes.25
An identity thief uses the personal information in a variety of ways. He may open
a new credit card account in the victim’s name or change the billing address on a
victim’s account, while accumulating charges26 on the credit line.27 Identity thieves
21
Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Emerging Technology and Employee Privacy: Symposium: The
Emergence of State Data Privacy and Security Laws Affecting Employers, 25 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 483, 485 (2008). The average laptop contains data worth $972,000 and
according to a Federal Bureau of Investigation Computer Crime Survey, the average annual
cost of computer security incidents in the U.S. is $67.2 billion. Id.
22

Chad Pinson, New Legal Frontier: Mass Information Loss and Security Breach, 11
SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 27, 31-32 (2007).
23
See Sasha Romanosky et. al., Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws Reduce Identity Theft?,
CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., at 4 (May 2008),
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/research/241full.pdf.
24

See Pinson, supra note 22, at 37. “[I]ndividuals whose information has been
compromised have sought legal redress against organizations from which their information
was taken using a variety of statutory and common law theories.” Id. at 32. “These cases may
prove to be the leading edge in an effort to set new standards for the care and safeguarding of
personal information.” Id.
25
See About Identity Theft, FTC,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/consumers/about-identity-theft.html, (last
visited Jan. 21, 2010). “The [Federal Trade Commission] estimates that as many as 9 million
Americans have their identities stolen each year.” Id.
26

See id. “While fraudulent charges on a victim’s credit card are the most common form
of financial fraud, such charges are easily removed from a victim’s bill.” Robert Lemos,
Stolen Lives, YOURSECURITYSOURCE.COM (Aug. 26, 2009),
http://www.robertlemos.com/journalism/2009/08/index.html (follow “Symantec’s
YourSecurityResource” hyperlink).
27

See FTC, supra note 25.
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may also create counterfeit checks using the victim’s name and account number, or
take out a loan in the victim’s name.28 An identity thief may even get a driver’s
license or official ID card in the victim’s name with the thief’s picture on it.29 In
2009 alone, the number of identity theft victims in the United States increased 12
percent from the previous year to 11.1 million people.30 In 2008, the Federal Trade
Commission reported that 8,237 Ohioans were identity theft victims.31
The number of identity theft victims is increasing because committing the crime
is relatively simple, while catching and prosecuting identity thieves is extremely
difficult.32 The difficulty begins with discovering whether the crime has even
occurred. In many cases, “the victim may not realize that her identity has been stolen
until months or years after the fact.”33 This delay between the crime’s commission
and its discovery makes it nearly impossible for law enforcement to find the
criminal.34 Even though identity theft causes the victim financial harm, the victim in
most cases is able to rectify the event by working with creditors and credit
monitoring agencies.35 On average, the victim is made whole after twenty-one hours
of working with law enforcement and creditors to clean up the effects of identity
theft.36 While the effects of identity theft are inconvenient for the victim, the
28

Id.

29

Id. Children’s identities are increasingly at risk. See Lemos, supra note 26. Criminals
prefer using children “because parents are less likely to monitor their children’s financial
information.” Id.
30
See Javelin Study Finds Identity Fraud Reached New High in 2009, but Consumers Are
Fighting Back, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/javelin-study-finds-identity-fraud-reached-new-high-in-2009-but-consumers-arefighting-back-83987287.html. Javelin Strategy & Research and leading companies in financial
services and identity fraud prevention technology and resolution produced this comprehensive
identity fraud survey. See id. “The survey is the nation's longest-running study of identity
fraud, with more than 29,000 U.S. respondents over the past seven years.” Id.
31

See Letter from Richard Cordray, Ohio Attorney General, to Ted Strickland et al.,
Governor et al. (Nov. 1, 2009), 2009 Identity Theft Annual Report, at 1, available at
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/getattachment/dc78834d-4df5-4a91-b180291f07f5efde/2009-Identity-Theft-PASSPORT-Program-Report.aspx. This is up 20 percent
from the two previous years. See id. It places Ohio in the middle of the pack of all states in the
number of annual identity theft incidents. See id.
32

See Darrow & Lichtenstein, supra note 20, at 25.

33

Id.

34

See id. It is estimated that over 90% of identity thieves are never caught or convicted.
See id.
35

See PR NEWSWIRE, supra note 30. Generally it takes a consumer around 21 hours or
over half a workweek to straighten out creditors when their identity has been stolen. See id.
36
See Tiffany Hsu, Identity Fraud on the Rise – Up 12% to 11.1 Million Adults Affected in
2009, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Feb. 10, 2010),
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2010/02/identity-fraud-on-the-rise-up-12-to-111million-adults-affected-in-2009.html. The twenty-one hours represents the individual hours it
will take a person to clean up the effects of having his identity stolen. See id. It does not mean
twenty-one hours in the sense of within twenty-one hours after discovering the theft, the
victim’s information will be cleared. See id. In addition to the twenty-one hours it takes to
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financial industry and law enforcement have become increasingly effective at
assisting consumers to correct instances of identity theft.37 There is, however, an area
of identity theft where the victim’s complete recovery is not as simple or even
guaranteed.
C. Medical Identity Theft
While identity theft receives a great deal of media coverage, few realize that
there are separate and distinct forms of the crime. Every year, three percent of all
identity theft victims, or approximately 330,00038 people, fall victim to medical
identity theft.39 “Medical identity theft refers to the misuse40 of an individual’s
personally identifiable information”41 “such as a name, date of birth, social security
number, or insurance policy number to obtain or bill for medical services or medical
goods.”42 An alarming example of medical identity theft is the situation that occurred
to Anndorie Sachs.43 A hospital notified Sachs that her newborn baby “tested

clear up a case of identity theft, the victim, on average, will spend $373 in out-of-pocket
expenses, unreimbursed losses, legal fees, and time taken off work. See id.
37

See PR NEWSWIRE, supra note 30. In 2009, it was estimated that the time it takes to
correct the effects of identity theft decreased 30% from the previous year. Hsu, supra note 36.
38

Based on the 2009 estimate of 11.1 million identity theft victims. See PR NEWSWIRE,
supra note 30.
39
Synovate, Federal Trade Commission-2006 Identity Theft Survey Report, 21 (Nov.
2007), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/11/SynovateFinalReportIDTheft2006.pdf.
40

Booz Allen Hamilton, Medical Identity Theft Environmental Scan, 4 (Oct. 15, 2008),
http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_10731_850701_0_0_18/HHS%2
0ONC%20MedID%20Theft_EnvScan_101008_Final%20COVER%20NOTE.pdf.
Id. at 5. For example, a consensual misuse is when a family member uses another family
member’s health information to get a drug prescription. See id. The term “misuse” includes
both consensual and nonconsensual forms of medical identity theft. See id. This article only
focuses on nonconsensual misuse of medical information because the information is obtained
through data breaches, which by definition are nonconsensual. See id.
41

Personally identifiable information is “any information about an individual maintained
by an agency, including, but not limited to, education, financial transactions, medical history,
and criminal or employment history and information which can be used to distinguish or trace
an individual’s identity, such as their name, social security number, date and place of birth,
mother’s maiden name, biometric records, etc., including any other personal information
which is linked or linkable to an individual.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT, OMB M-06-19, REPORTING INCIDENTS INVOLVING PERSONALLY
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION AND INCORPORATING THE COSTS FOR SECURITY IN AGENT
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/OMB/memornada/fy2006/m06-19.pdf (reporting incidents involving personally
identifiable information and incorporating the cost for security in agency information
technology investments).
42
43

Hamilton, supra note 40, at 1.

See Caitlin A. Johnson, Protect Against Medical ID Theft, Medical ID Theft Nearly
Ruined a Good Mother’s Life (Oct. 9, 2006), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/10/09/
earlyshow/living/ConsumerWatch/main2073225.shtml.
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positive for illegal drugs.”44 Sachs was surprised by the call because she had not
recently given birth to any children.45 The situation worsened the following day. Law
enforcement officers threatened to take her actual four children away because of the
positive drug test.46 Only after Sachs worked with the hospital and law enforcement
officers was it discovered that someone had stolen her driver’s license and went to
the hospital to give birth under her name.47
This example is by no means the only way the crime is perpetrated. Medical
identity theft occurs in many ways and each way potentially exposes the victim to
the risk of having inaccurate information stored in his or her medical records.48
Below are four common examples of how the crime is perpetrated:
•
•

•
•

“A person uses…the identity of another…to obtain medical care
because the [person] is uninsured.”49
“A [person] uses the identity of another to obtain medical care because
the [person] does not want [his] health records to include information
about his . . . health status.” Specifically, the identity thief desires to
prevent his current or future employer, or “insurance provider from
knowing aspects of [his] true health condition.”50
A person uses the victim’s identity to obtain a drug prescription for
recreational use or criminal distribution.51
A person obtains the victim’s health information. Then in a separate
incident, the thief also steals the personal indentifying information
needed to pose as a physician and submits claims for reimbursement to
an insurance provider for services never rendered to any individual.52
This is not uncommon and can “involve hundreds of identities and the
submission of millions of dollars’ worth of false claims.”53

44

Id.

45

See id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Hamilton, supra note 40, at 6.

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id. “The unique physician identification numbers (UPIN) that are used to bill both
private insurance and Medicare/Medicaid are frequently compromised.” Kim McKay, Identity
Theft Steals Millions from Government Health Programs, (Feb. 13, 2008), http://www.gov
tech.com/gt/260202. Additionally, an individual who receives Medicare/Medicaid also has a
special identification number. Id. This number is also frequently used to defraud both federal
programs and private insurance. See id. For example, 38 people in Miami-Dade, Florida,
defrauded the Medicare program for $142 million. Lesley Clark, Feds Arrest 38 in Medicare
Fraud Crackdown, Miami Herald, May 10, 2007, http://www.aegis.com/news/mh/2007/
MH070501.html. The thieves defrauded the government of the price wheelchairs, walkers,
and other equipment. See id.
53

Hamilton, supra note 40, at 6.
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When data breach results in medical identity theft, the results can be even more
severe than what occurs in regular identity theft.54 It is more severe because the
results of medical identity theft do not simply affect the victim’s pecuniary interests;
medical identity theft affects the victim’s health and privacy interests as well.
Specifically, medical identity theft can “result in the exhaustion of the victim’s
insurance benefits.”55 A victim may also “experience difficulties or delays in
receiving future health care services or denial of coverage” altogether because of
pre-existing conditions erroneously contained in the victim’s medical history.56 “The
victim may be billed for deductibles, co-payments, or other costs the healthcare
provider delivered to the thief.”57
The victim’s privacy interest is also affected. Medical identity theft infringes on
the trust that patients have with their healthcare providers, commonly referred to as a
breach of trust.58 To illustrate, privacy is of major concern for clinical trial
participants and others who have serious health problems.59 “[W]hen volunteers
enroll in a clinical study, they place great trust in the researchers and study staff,
expecting them to act both responsibility and ethically.”60 When these breaches of
trust occur, “many individuals would feel a sacred trust was violated by healthcare
providers and institutions.”61

54

Stacy Bradford, Medical Identity Theft Can Happen to You (June 17, 2009),
http://moneywatch.bnet.com/saving-money/blog/family-finance/medical-identity-theft-canhappen-to-you/727/. The stakes are higher because “[u]nlike regular identity theft, this type of
fraud could put your health in jeopardy and seems nearly impossible to prevent.” Id.
Additionally, when regular identity theft occurs, the thief uses the information in financial
transactions. These can be relatively easy to fix because all financial information is contained
in a central location. For example, all credit information flows through credit monitoring
agencies. In contrast, medical information is not stored in a central repository. “[H]ealth
information often flows to different recipients, such as primary care providers, specialists,
health care business associates, insurance plans, researchers, and others.” Hamilton, supra
note 40, at 8. There are ways to counteract the theft of personal health information including
examining the explanation of benefits forms, monitoring benefits by asking for a list of claims
paid, and checking medical records and correcting inaccuracies. Id. at 31.
55

Hamilton, supra note 40, at 8.

56

Id.

57

Id. “Victims are burdened with the task of proving that they are not responsible for the
charges, and if they cannot, records of these unpaid costs can affect their credit rating.” Id.
58

Ellen Nakashima & Rick Weiss, Patients’ Date on Stolen Laptop, Washington Post,
Mar.24, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/03/23/AR2008032301753.html.
59

See id.

60

Id.

61
Mark A. Rothstein, Currents in Contemporary Ethics, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 507, 510
(2009). A study indicated that only 1% of people surveyed would feel comfortable if medical
researchers were free to use their personal health information without their consent. See A. F.
Westin, How the Public Views Privacy and Health Research, 20 (2007),
www.hca.wa.gov/hit/documents/westiniomsrvyreport1107.doc.
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Regardless of how serious the previously mentioned medical identity theft
injuries are, they pale in comparison to the most dangerous consequence of the
crime: having incorrect health information entered into the victim’s medical
records.62 This is particularly dangerous because a healthcare provider may rely on
false health information and provide inappropriate care like “transfusing the wrong
blood type, performing procedures that are unnecessary or even harmful,” or
inadvertently prescribing medications that could cause an adverse reaction.63 Take,
for example, what happened to Lind Weaver.64 Weaver, a 57-year-old from Palm
Coast, Florida, received a bill in the mail from her local hospital requesting payment
for the amputation of her right foot.65 After weeks of clearing up the mess with the
hospital, including a hostile meeting with the hospital’s chief administrator where
she stormed in and kicked her heels on his desk proclaiming, “Obviously, I have
both of my feet,” all parties presumed that the matter was resolved.66 Unfortunately,
it was not. When Weaver was hospitalized a year later for a hysterectomy, the nurse
reviewing her chart said, “I see you have diabetes.”67 This alarmed Weaver, who was
not a diabetic.68 But for the fact that Weaver was conscious while the nurse was
reading the information, Weaver could have been seriously injured if not killed
during the surgery.69 This example illustrates the true severity of medical identity
theft and why regulations, both state and federal, should be proactive in their
approach to preventing the crime.
The reality, however, is that medical identity theft is on the rise. This rise can be
attributed to the fact that the street value of personal medical information is more
valuable than general personal information.70 For instance, credit card numbers and
bank account personal identification numbers sell from $10 to $20, compared to
$150 to $200 for documents containing personal medical information.71 Another
reason, as fully explained later in this note, is that federal regulation regarding
privacy of health information has been poorly enforced.72

62

Hamilton, supra note 40, at 8.

63

Id.

64

Diagnosis: Identity Theft, Business Week, Jan. 8, 2007, http://www.businessweek.com/
magazine/content/07_02/b4016041,htm.
65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

See Steve Lohr, The New Hacker Economics, N.Y. Times, May 8, 2008,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/08/the-new-hacker-economics/.
71

Id.

72

See generally Rob Stein, Medical Privacy Law Nets No Fines, Washington Post, June 5,

2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/04/AR2006060400672.html.
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Medical identity theft affects more than just the individual. It also affects
payers,73 providers,74 federal agencies,75 and society as a whole.76 Payers, for
example, bear the costs of services provided in incidents of medical identity theft.77
It is also possible that they incur negative publicity, which could affect the
business’s reputation and goodwill.78 Health care providers are affected in that they
may rely on corrupted health records and improperly provide medical assistance to a
patient.79 Even though “[the] law is not yet clear on legal actions that can be taken
against a provider related to negligence, malpractice, or other legal action,” the
defense costs and settlement offers alone could be significant.80
Federal agencies are also affected by medical identity theft because of the cost of
investigating crimes, prosecuting criminals, enforcing federal rules, and payouts to
criminals as a direct fraud victim.81 For example, in 2007 the Department of Justice
identified 120 cases of healthcare fraud.82 In financial terms, nearly three percent of
national healthcare costs, or $60 billion, are fraud-related.83 Given that the federal
government is the largest payer of healthcare costs, the financial impact of medical
identity theft is substantial.84
Finally, society as a whole suffers from the effects of medical identity theft.
Private-pay patients pay more for healthcare since providers must offset the losses
73

“[P]ayers are entities that accept responsibility for payment to providers on behalf of
enrolled consumers. They include organizations and institutions such as health insurance
plans, federal programs, and health care sponsors, such as employers or unions.” Hamilton,
supra note 40, at 10.
74

“Health care providers are facilities that make health services available to consumers.
These include hospitals, skilled nursing homes, long term care facilities, pharmacies, labs, and
diagnostic facilities.” Nat’l Alliance for Health Info. Tech., Defining Key Health Information
Technology Terms, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 20 (Apr. 28, 2008),
http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_10741_848133_0_0_18/10_2_hit
_terms.pdf.
75

This includes Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Indian Health Services,
Veterans Administration, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Justice, Federal
Trade Commission, Department of Health and Human Services, and the Social Security
Administration. Hamilton, supra note 40, at 13.
76
AHIMA e-HIM Work Group on Medical Identity Theft, Mitigating Medical Identity
Theft, July 7, 2008, 7 Journal of AHIMA 79, (2008) AHIMA e-HIM Work Group on Medical
Identity Theft, Mitigating Medical Identity Theft, 79 J. AHIMA 7, 63 (2008), available at
http://library.ahima.org/xpedio/groups/public/documents/ahima/bok1_039058.hcsp?dDocNam
e=bok1_039058.
77

Hamilton, supra note 40, at 11.

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

AHIMA, supra note 76.

81

See Hamilton, supra note 40, at 13.

82

Id. at 14.

83

Id.

84

Id.
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they incur because of medical identity theft.85 Additionally, taxpayers essentially
fund government medical benefit payouts for fraudulent claims and government
agency investigations of medical fraud and identity theft.86
With medical identity theft being such a severe crime, federal and state
legislatures have enacted statutes in an attempt to prevent the crime from occurring.
The next two sections explore the federal approach and Ohio’s approach to
preventing medical identity theft.
III. FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO PREVENT MEDICAL IDENTITY THEFT
The threat of data breaches alone, separate and distinct from the threat of identity
theft and medical identity theft, is of major concern for lawmakers in the United
States.87 To deal with the issue of privacy, the federal government has separated
privacy issues concerning healthcare from general concerns regarding the privacy of
general personal information. The separation is without question due to the public’s
reasonable expectation of privacy as it relates to medical information.88 Legislation
in this area is likely to continue to develop because, as shown earlier, there are a
variety of stakeholders who are adversely affected when data breaches and medical
identity theft occurs.
The most prominent federal regulation dealing directly with data breach of
medical information is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA),89 amended in 2009 by the Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act).90 Though separately discussed in
this note, they are one cohesive piece of federal legislation that imposes data breach
notification requirements on healthcare providers when their information systems are
breached. This scheme of data breach notification requirements is designed to be an
effective tool to prevent medical identity theft from occurring; however, its lack of
enforcement has not produced the type of results necessary to achieve a significant
decrease in the number of medical identity theft cases occurring each year.

85

See AHIMA, supra note 76.

86

Id.

87
The federal government has enacted specific regulatory schemes for protecting personal
information. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act protects health
information. 45 C.F.R. § 164.306. Financial Institutions are required to protect the data they
possess under the Federal Trade Commissions’ Safeguards Rule. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58
(LexisNexis 2008). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act protects consumers’ personal financial
information. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 138 (1999). Finally,
the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act protects information gathered online about
children under the age of thirteen. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506.
88
F. LAWRENCE STREET & MARK P. GRANT, LAW OF THE INTERNET §206(6) (Matthew
Bender & Company, Inc. eds., 17th ed. 2009).. The reasonable expectation of privacy can be
eliminated when patients sign waivers when receiving medical treatment. Id. Some waivers,
when defined broadly may eliminate the reasonable expectation of privacy altogether. Id.
89
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 1936 (1996).
90

See Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH
Act), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
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A. HIPAA
The primary privacy regulatory regime for the health care industry is HIPAA.91
The Act was passed to “improve portability and continuity of health insurance
coverage in the group and individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in
health insurance . . . .”92 The Act’s regulations are very broad and cover nearly all
healthcare entities.93 It applies to “health plans,94 health clearing houses,95 and health

91

Christine Easter, Special Topic, Auditing for Privacy, 2 I/S J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO.
SOC’Y 879, 879 (2006).
92
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936, 1936 (1996) (emphasis added).
93

A health care provider includes a provider of services, a provider of medical or other
health services, and any other person furnishing health care services or supplies. HIPPA, Pub.
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2022 (1996). "Provider of services" means a hospital, critical
access hospital, skilled nursing facility, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facility, home
health agency, hospice program, or, a fund. Id; 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395x(u) (LexisNexis 2010).
94
A health plan means an individual or group plan that provides, or pays the cost of,
medical care. It includes any of the following and any combination thereof:

1.

A group health plan, but only if the plan
a.

has 50 or more participants; or

b.

is administered by an entity other than the employer who established
and maintains the plan.

2.

A health insurance issuer.

3.

A health maintenance organization.

4.

Part A and part B of the Medicare Program under title XVIII.

5.

The Medicaid program under title XIX.

6.

A Medicare supplemental policy.

7.

A long term care policy, including a nursing home fixed indemnity policy
(unless the DHHS Secretary determines that such a policy does not provide
sufficiently comprehensive coverage of a benefit so that the policy should be
treated as a health plan).

8.

An employee welfare benefit plan or any other arrangement, which is
established or maintained for the purpose of offering or providing health
benefits to the employees of 2 or more employers.

9.

The health care program for active military personal under title 10 of the
United States Code.

10. The veterans health care program.
11. The Civilian health and Medical Program of Uniformed Services.
12. The Indian health service program.
13. The Federal Employees Health Benefit Plan.
HIPPA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2022-23 (1996).
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care providers,96 who transmit any health information in electronic form in
connection with a transaction.”97
HIPAA has two key provisions. The first is the Security Rule, which protects
electronic health information.98 Unfortunately, the rule is general and vague.99 For
example, it requires covered entities to “ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of all electronic protected health information the covered entity creates,
receives, maintains, or transmits.”100 Additionally, the rule requires each covered
entity to protect against any reasonably anticipated unauthorized uses,101 “threats, or
hazards to the security or integrity of information.”102 These examples show that the
Security Rule is vague because it does not set out specific ways for covered entities
to comply with these requirements. Instead, the Security Rule merely states that
“covered entities may use any security measures that allow the covered entity to
reasonably and appropriately implement the standards” listed in the Rule.103 This rule
is aspirational rather than a concrete regulatory scheme where both the covered
95

A health care clearinghouse is a public or private entity that processes or facilitates the
processing of nonstandard data elements of health information into standard data elements.
HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2021 (1996).
96
The term health care provider includes a provider of services, a provider of medical or
other health services, and any other person furnishing health care services or supplies.
HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2022 (1996). The term provider of services
means a hospital, critical access hospital, skilled nursing facility, comprehensive outpatient
rehabilitation facility, home health agency, hospice program, or a fund in certain instances. 42
U.S.C. § 1395x(u) (LexisNexis 2010).
97

HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2023 (1996).

98

45 C.F.R. § 164.302 (LexisNexis 2010). The information includes “any information,
whether oral or recorded in any form or medium, that is created or received by a health care
provider, health plan, public health authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or
health care clearinghouse; and relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health
or condition of an individual, the provision of health care to an individual, or the past, present,
or future payment for the provision of heatlh care to an individual.” HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936, 2022 (1996).
99

Easter, supra note 91, at 882.

100

45 C.F.R. 164.306(a)(1).

101

§ 164.306(a)(3).

102

§ 164.306(a)(2).

103

§ 164.306(d)(1). In deciding how to meet the standards, the covered entity may consider
the following factors:
1. The size, complexity, and capabilities of the covered entity;
2. The covered entity’s technical infrastructure, hardware, and
software security capabilities;
3. The costs of security measures; [and]
4. The probability and criticality of potential risks to electronic
protected health information.
Id.
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entities as well as the agency responsible for enforcing the regulation’s requirements
know exactly when an entity is in or out of compliance.
The second key provision is the Privacy Rule. “The rule [was designed to]
establish the first set of basic national privacy standards and fair information
practices that provides all Americans with a basic level of protection and peace of
mind that is essential to their full participation in their care.”104 There are four
relevant standards expressed in the Privacy Rule. The first is that a covered entity
may not use or disclose personal health information, except as permitted or required
by the rule.105 The permitted uses and disclosures include disclosures to the
individual for treatment, payment, or otherwise in compliance with the rules, and
incident to an otherwise permitted use.106 The second standard limits a covered
entity’s use and disclosure of patient information when using the information for
reasons other than treatment.107 The third standard is that covered entities must also
use and disclose personal health information subject to any agreed upon restriction
the entity may have made with the patient.108 Finally, an individual has a right to be
notified of a covered entity’s uses and disclosures of his protected health
information.109
The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS
Secretary) enforces HIPAA.110 This department has promulgated and codified
rules.111 To enforce HIPAA’s requirements, the DHHS Secretary can hear
complaints or it can conduct compliance audits on its own.112 “Despite possessing
the authority to independently conduct compliance reviews, the DHHS primarily
relies on a complaint-driven system that refrains from initiating any sort of
‘widespread effort to audit and detect violations.’”.113 The enforcement strategy as a
whole was purposely designed “as a reactive, rather than a proactive, process.”114
104
See HIPAA Privacy Rule, RUTGERS UNIV. DIV. OF INFO. PROT. AND SEC., (Mar. 5, 2009,
3:14 PM), http://rusecure.rutgers.edu/content/hipaa-privacy-rule.
105

45 C.F.R. 164.502.

106

Id. There are other permitted uses as well as some required disclosures.

107

See id.

108

Id.

109

45 C.F.R. § 164.520. There are many exceptions to this rule including exceptions for
group health plans and inmates. See id.
110

Carlos A. Leyva & Deborah L. Leyva, HIPAA Survival Guide for Providers: Privacy
and Security Rules 1, 7 (2009 – 2010), http://www.hipaasurvivalguide.com/hipaa-survivalguide.pdf.
111

Id.

112

Id. at 16; 45 C.F.R. § 160.306; 45 C.F.R. §160.308.

113

Tobi M. Murphy, Comment, Enforcement of the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Moving From
Illusory Voluntary Compliance to Continuous Compliance Through Private Accreditation, 54
LOY. L. REV. 155, 171 (2008).
114

Id.; Kevin Fogarty, Stitching up Health Records: Privacy Compliance Lags, eWEEK
(Apr. 16, 2006), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Health-Care-IT/Stitching-Up-Health-RecordsPrivacy-Compliance-Lags (confirming the preference by DHHS that problems between or
within organizations be settled independently).

126

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 24:111

A major flaw in HIPAA’s Security and Privacy Rules, as originally enacted, was
that it did not provide covered entities with instructions on what to do when data
systems were breached. Additionally, the Security and Privacy Rules were vague and
overly general, leading to a lack of governmental follow-through in the area of
enforcement.115 For example, as of July 31, 2010, the Office of Civil Rights, which
enforces both the Privacy and Security Rules under the direction of the Health and
Human Services Department, had received approximately 53,789 complaints of
privacy violations, of which 17,381 were referred for additional investigation.116 The
Office of Civil Rights then dismissed 5,960 (34%) complaints as non-violations of
the HIPAA Privacy Rule and resolved the remaining 11,421 (66%) complaints
through informal actions.117 At this time, none of the investigations conducted by the
Health and Human Services Department have resulted in the issuance of a single
civil penalty.118 In addition, between April 30, 2003 and July 31, 2010, only 474
(less than 1%) of the greater than 53,000 complaints received by the Office of Civil
Rights were referred to the Department of Justice for criminal investigation.119 This
lack of government follow through led one commentator to assert that the Act is
“like dad telling the kids he’s going to count to three and then saying, “One . . . two .
. . two and half . . . two and three quarters . . . .”120
Because HIPAA did not have data breach notification instructions and its
requirements were vague, Congress amended it in 2009 to provide requirements that
are more concrete.121 The data breach notification rules were published on August
24, 2009 and became effective September 23, 2009.122
B. The HITECH Act Amends HIPAA
In 2009, the HITECH Act was passed to amend HIPAA.123 President Obama
signed the Act as part of the $787 billion economic American Recovery and
115

See Gienna Shaw, Does Anybody Care About HIPAA Anymore?, HEALTHLEADERS
MEDIA (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.healthleadersmedia.com/content/TEC-246265/DoesAnybody-Care-About-HIPAA-Anymore.
116
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HIPAA Enforcement Highlights - Numbers at a
Glance, HHS.gov,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/highlights/indexnumbers.html#total%20in
vestigated (last updated July 31, 2010).
117

Id.

118

See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., supra note 116.

119

Id.

120

Shaw, supra note 115.

121

See Womble Carlyle, Action Required: HIPAA Security Breach Notification Rules
(Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.wcsr.com/client-alerts/action-required-hipaa-security-breachnotification-rules-effective-september-23-2009-additional-hitech-act-provisions-effectiveearly-next-year.
122
123

See id.

Dom Nicastro, Economic Stimulus Act Heightens HIPAA Enforcement, HCPro (Feb. 17,
2009),
http://healthplans.hcpro.com/content.cfm?content_id=228444&topic=WS_HLM2_HEP.
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Reinvestment Act of 2009, commonly referred to as the “Stimulus Package.”124 This
amendment is significant because the “Stimulus Package” provides financial
incentives for healthcare organizations that are willing to take steps to utilize
Electronic Health Record technology.125 As a string attached to these financial
incentives, the Act requires certain security measures to be taken to protect patient
information.126 The Act is significant in this context because it specifies security
breach notification requirements for covered entities.127
The HITECH Act requires HIPAA covered entities dealing with unsecured
personal health information128 to notify each individual whose unsecured protected
health information has been breached129 or is reasonably believed to have been
accessed, acquired, or disclosed as a result of a breach.130 The covered entity must
give the notice within 60 calendar days after discovering a breach.131 When the
covered entity provides notice, it must include:
124

Id.

125

Waller Lansden Dortch & Davis, LLP, Stimulus Package Provides Incentives for the
Use of Health Information Technology, Electronic Health Records, Feb. 14, 2009,
http://www.wallerlaw.com/articles/2009/02/14/stimulus-package-provides-incentives-for-theuse-of-health-information-technology-electronic-health-records.8163. The “Stimulus
Package” states that healthcare providers, like doctors and hospitals, will be reimbursed by
higher Medicare and Medicaid payments if they put the systems in place by 2011. See id.
“Doctors can receive up to $60,000 and hospitals up to $11 million.” Tom Breen, Stimulus
Gives Incentives for e-health Records, OmniMD (May 11, 2009),
http://www.myemrstimulus.com/tag/doctors/.
126

Gregg Blesh, HHS’ New Civil Rights Chief to Enforce HIPAA,
MODERNHEALTHCARE.COM (Sept. 16, 2009),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20090916/REG/309169988#. The Department of
Health and Human Services reiterated the importance of performing HIPAA compliance
audits. See id. In 2009, “[DHHS] Secretary Kathleen Sebelius appointed Georgina Verdugo, a
former prosecutor and Clinton administration official to lead the department's [Office of Civil
Rights], which recently took over enforcement of [HIPAA’s] security rule . . . ” Id.
127
Cynthia M. Conner et al., American Health Lawyers Association 2008-2009 Year in
Review, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 1, 41 (2009). The connection between the 2009 “Stimulus
Package” and these breach notification requirements is that “The [“Stimulus Packacge”]
contains billions to fund health IT for expanding the implementation and exchange of
electronic records.” Nicastro, supra note 123. “To do [this] successfully and safely, Congress
recognize[d] the need for broader and stronger, more explicit privacy and security controls.”
See id.
128

In this context, “dealing with” means to, “access, maintain, retain, modify, record, store,
destroy, or otherwise hold, use, or disclose unsecured protected health information.” See
HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13402(a), 123 Stat. 115 (2009). “’Unsecured protected
heath information’ means protected health information that is not secured through the use of
technology or methodology specified by the [DHHS] Secretary.” See HITECH Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-5, § 13402(h)(1)(A), 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
129
Breach means the “unauthorized acquisition, access, use or disclosure of protected
health information, which compromises the security or privacy of such information…”
HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13400(1)(A), 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
130
131

HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13402(a), 123 Stat. 115 (2009).
See id. at, § 13402(d)(1).
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(1) A brief description of what happened, including the date of the breach
and the date the breach was discovered...; (2) A description of the types
of unsecured protected health information that [was] involved in the
breach…; (3) The steps individuals should take to protect themselves
from potential harm resulting from the breach[;] (4) A brief description of
what the covered entity is doing to investigate the breach, to mitigate
losses, and to protect against any further breaches; and (5) Contact
procedures for individuals to ask questions or learn additional
information, which shall include a toll-free telephone number, an e-mail
address, website, or postal address.132
The HITECH Act also provides each state’s attorney general the authority to
enforce its provisions.133 For example, on January 15, 2010, Connecticut’s attorney
general was the first to file a suit against a covered entity under the HITECH Act.134
When a state’s attorney general has reason to believe that an interest of one or more
of the residents of that state has been or is threatened by a person violating the Act,
the attorney general may bring a civil action on behalf of the residents of the state in
federal court.135 The attorney general may seek an injunction or statutory damages.136
State attorneys general do not have exclusive authority to enforce the HITECH
Act regulations. The DHHS Secretary also has the authority to assess civil monetary
penalties and negotiate monetary settlements for HITECH Act violations.137 The
money received from these penalties and settlements is sent to the Office for Civil
Rights, which is an office of the Department of Health and Human Services, to be
used to further enforce HIPAA’s requirements.138 As of the publication of this note,
all monetary penalties and settlements recovered will go to the Officer for Civil
Rights; however, the HITECH Act sets out a plan to get recommendations and
implement a system that allows individuals harmed by HIPAA violations to receive
a percentage of the money.139 This plan is to be executed within three years,140 but
even when it is completed, individuals will not have access to civil awards won by
132

Id. § 13402(f).

133

Id. § 13410(e).

134

Keith L. Martin, Conn. AG Sues Health Net Over “Ethically Unacceptable” Data
Breach, IAFwebnews.com (Jan. 15, 2010), http://ifawebnews.com/2010/01/15/conn-ag-sueshealth-net-over-ethically-unacceptable-data-breach/. The attorney general filed suit against
Health Net of Connecticut for a data breach jeopardizing the personal information of 446,000
of its members. Id. “The [lawsuit] alleges that the insurer failed to effectively supervise and
train its workforce on policies and procedures concerning the appropriate maintenance, use,
and disclosure of protected health information.” Id.
135

HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13410(e), 123 Stat. 115 (2009).

136

Id. The total amount of damages imposed may not exceed $25,000 in a calendar year.
Additionally, if the attorney general brings a successful action, he may be awarded the costs of
the action and reasonable attorney fees to the state. Id.
137

See id. § 13410(a).

138

Id. § 13410(c).

139

Id. § 13410(a).

140

See id. § 13410(c)(3).
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their respective state attorney general.141 Unless the individual’s respective state law
allows a citizen to recover a percentage of an action brought by a state attorney
general, the individual will not have access to any monetary penalties won by the
state attorney general under HIPAA.142 This distinction exists because the federal
statute only governs the awards the DHHS Secretary receives.143 In other words,
each state is responsible for enacting legislation to govern whether state residents
harmed by a data breach will have access to monetary penalties awarded to their
state’s attorney general and to what extent.144
Even though the Act gives state attorneys general the right to enforce its
provisions, this right is not absolute. Before an attorney general can file a civil
action, he must provide notice to the DHHS Secretary.145 This is significant because
the DHHS Secretary can intervene in the action.146 The text’s plain language leads to
the inference that the DHHS Secretary can literally block civil actions initiated by a
state attorney general.147 An additional issue is that the statute’s language allows for
this intervention, but there is no restrictive language that allows a state attorney
general to know when the intervention would be appropriate.148 This lack of
restrictive language leads to the inference that at any time, and for any reason, the
DHHS Secretary has the discretion to intervene in a civil action brought by a state
attorney general. The DHHS Secretary’s ability to intervene may pose a serious
threat to a state attorney general’s ability to enforce the new data breach notification
requirements.
Even if state attorneys general find it difficult to enforce HIPAA and its HITECH
Act amendments, the federal statutory scheme gives states the authority, in specific
instances, to enforce data breach notification requirements based on their own state
laws.
C. Federal Preemption of State Laws
While HIPAA is a robust federal regulatory scheme, it does not completely
preempt state law. The Supremacy Clause stands for the proposition that the
Constitution and the laws of the federal government are, in most cases, more forceful

141

See id. § 13410(c)(1).

142

See id.

143

See id. For civil awards received by the DHHS Secretary, the HITECH Act directs that
those funds “shall be transferred to the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health
and Human Services to be used for purposes of enforcing the provisions of this subtitle . . . .”
Id.
144

See id.

145

See id. § 13410(e).

146

See id. § 13410(e)(1).

147

“The State shall serve prior written notice of any action . . . upon the [DHHS] Secretary
and provide the [DHHS] Secretary with a copy of its complaint . . . The [DHHS] Secretary
shall have the right to intervene in the action.” Id.
148
See id. The only time where the Act specifically states that a state attorney general may
not bring an action is when the DHHS Secretary has already instituted an action against a
person. See id.
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than state laws.149 Because of this, inconsistent state laws are generally preempted or
trumped by federal laws.150 When the laws are not in conflict, preemption can either
be implied or expressly stated in federal legislation.151
Here, HIPAA expressly preempts state law and supports state law in certain
instances. In general, a HIPAA standard, requirement, or implementation
specification that is contrary to a provision of state law preempts the state law.152
However, a contrary state law may not be preempted if the DHHS Secretary
determines that the state law is necessary: “(1) [t]o prevent fraud and abuse related to
the provision of or payment of health care; (2) [t]o ensure appropriate State
regulation of insurance and health plans to the extent expressly authorized by statute
or regulation; (3) [f]or State reporting on health care delivery or costs; or (4) for
purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or
welfare . . . "153 Additionally, an inconsistent state statute may not be preempted if
the DHHS Secretary determines that its principal purpose is the “regulation of the
manufacture, registration, distribution, dispensing, or other control of any controlled
substances,” or that a “controlled substance by state law.”154
HIPAA’s most unique preemption provision says that a state law relating to the
privacy of individually identifiable health information that is more stringent than a
HIPAA standard, requirement, or implementation specification will not be
preempted.155 The regulation provides minimal guidance for state laws relating to the
privacy of health information. Thus, each state law must be independently examined,
and those that are more protective are not preempted.156 Generally, state laws
regarding covered entities are almost always more stringent.157 Under HIPAA, a state
law is more stringent if:
(1) the state law prohibits or further limits the use or disclosure of
protected health information; (2) the state law permits individuals with
greater rights of access to or amendment of their individually identifiable
149

See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance Thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. (emphasis added).
150

See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 882 (2000).

151

See Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987).

152

45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2010).

153

Id. §160.203(a)(1).

154

Id. § 160.203(a)(2).

155

See id. § 160.203(b).

156

See Jennifer Guthrie, Time Is Running Out- The Burdens and Challenges of HIPAA
Compliance: A Look at Preemption Analysis, the “Minimum Necessary” Standard, and the
Notice of Privacy Practices, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 143, 150 (2003).
157

See Leyva & Leyva, supra note 110, at 14.
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health information; (3) the state law provides for more information to be
disseminated to the individual regarding use and disclosure of their
protected health information; (4) the state law imposes stricter standards
for record keeping or accounting of disclosures; or (5) the state law
strengthens privacy protections for individuals with respect to any other
matter.158
Under this regulatory scheme, Ohio has sufficient room to enact legislation to
protect its residents from medical identity theft. Regrettably, the state has explicitly
opted to leave privacy issues related to healthcare providers to the federal
government.
IV. OHIO’S DATA BREACH LAW DOES NOT COVER HIPAA COVERED ENTITIES
Ohio, like many other states,159 has enacted laws regarding data breach
notification. Ohio’s law covers breaches of security systems that house personal
information.160 While Ohio’s law does cover Ohio governmental agencies,
individuals, and entities that conduct business161 in Ohio, it does not regulate
healthcare providers.162 Specifically, Ohio’s data breach notification laws do not
apply to any HIPAA-covered entity.163
Ohio’s statute is limited to protecting general personal information, such as an
individual’s name, in combination with and linked to the individual’s social security
number, drivers license number, or account, credit or debit card number with an

158

45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2010).

159
Just about every state has adopted some form of data encryption and regulation law.
“As a result, all businesses should understand fully the importance of these new legal
requirements…” Michael D. Stovsky, New Data Encryption Laws and Regulations Require
Compliance, Ulmer Berne, LLP Client Alert (February 2009),
http://ulmer.com/articlesalerts/clientalerts/Documents/02%20February%20%20Data%20Encryption.pdf. Businesses should take steps to comply with these laws because
the “laws or regulations apply directly, or because the concepts contained in these new laws or
regulations will likely become applicable in one form or another.” Id.
160
OHIO. REV. CODE. ANN. § 1349.19(A)(1)(1) (LexisNexis 2010). Ohio defines a breach
of the security system as, “unauthorized access to and acquisition of computerized data that
compromises the security or confidentiality of personal information owned or licensed by a
person and that causes, reasonably is believed to have caused, or reasonably is believed will
cause a material risk of identity theft or other fraud to the person or property of a resident of
this state.” Id.
161
Jeffrey L. Kapp, et al., Data Protection and Privacy: Ohio Enacts Security Breach
Notification Law, Jones Day (February 2006),
http://www.jonesday.com/newsknowledge/publicationdetail.aspx?publication=3129. The
concept of “conducting business” is not clearly defined in the notification law and it appears
that physical presence in Ohio is not required. Id.
162
163

Id.

OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 1349.19(F)(2) (LexisNexis 2010). “This section does not
apply to any person or entity that is a covered entity as defined in 45 C.F.R. 160.103 . . . .” Id.
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access code that would permit access to an individual’s financial account.164 In fact,
the statute does not even mention health related information.
The law applies to “any person165 who owns or licenses computerized data that
includes personal information.”166 Because most businesses store customer
information in electronic form, virtually every business falls under this statute,
unless it is otherwise exempted, such as HIPAA covered entities. The statute
requires businesses to notify Ohio residents of data breaches under certain
conditions:
(1) When a business discovers or is notified of a breach to its information
system; (2) The business knows or reasonably believes that an Ohio
resident’s personal information was accessed and acquired by an
unauthorized person; and (3) The business believes that the access and
acquisition of the Ohio resident’s information creates a material risk of
identity theft or other fraud.167
Ohio requires that the notification be given within 45 days after the discovery of
the breach.168 This notification can be done by letter, e-mail,169 or phone.170
In the event that a business or individual violates any of Ohio’s data breach
notification requirements, it may be subject to civil liability.171 Ohio’s attorney
general has the “exclusive” authority to bring civil actions against companies that
violate Ohio’s data breach notification laws.172 The statute authorizes the attorney
general to seek temporary restraining orders, preliminary or permanent injunctions,

164
OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 1349.19(A)(7)(a) (LexisNexis 2010). The language of the
statute does indicates that if the personal information is encrypted, redacted, or altered in a
method that makes it unreadable, the personal information does not fall under the statute. Id.
Encryption means to transform data into a form that has a low probability of assigning
meaning without use of a confidential process or key. Id. § 1349.19(A)(4). Redaction means
to alter the information so that no more than the last four digits of a social security number,
driver’s license number, state identification card number, account number, or credit or debit
card number is accessible as part of the data. Id. § 1349.19(A)(8).
165
Person includes both natural persons and business entities conducting business in Ohio.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19(A)(6).
166

Id. § 1349.19(B)(1).

167

See id.

168

See id. § 1349.19(B)(2).

169

Electronic notice is only appropriate when the person’s primary method of
communication with the Ohio resident is through electronic means. See id. § 1349.19(E)(2).
170

Id. §1349.19(E). Substitute forms of notice are available if the company can show that it
does not have sufficient customer contact information or that the cost of notification would
exceed $250,000 or if the number of customers exceeds 500,000. If one of these requirements
are met, a company may notify consumers of the breach by e-mail, posting on the customer’s
website, or through a major media outlet that reaches at least 75% of Ohio residents. Id.
171

See id. § 1349.19(I).

172

See id. § 1349.192(A)(1).
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and civil penalties.173 The attorney general has the exclusive authority to bring a
civil action and may do so “based on complaints or the attorney general’s own
inquiries.”174 Penalties that are received as a result of the attorney general’s actions
are deposited into a consumer protection enforcement fund; however, the money is
never given directly to the consumers.175 “The money in the consumer protection
enforcement fund [is] used for the sole purpose of paying expenses incurred by the
consumer protection section of the office of the attorney general.”176
Because Ohio has expressly decided not to enact legislation to further protect the
privacy of individual’s health information, it adds nothing to the national effort to
prevent medical identity theft.
V. OHIO SHOULD AMEND ITS DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAW
As shown above, Ohio has the authority and the ability to enact state legislation
to help prevent medical identity theft. Specifically, there are four things that the state
legislature can do to help prevent medical identity theft and provide its citizens relief
when the crime occurs. First, the state should amend its data breach notification law
to include HIPAA covered entities. Second, the state should require healthcare
providers to notify consumers every time their information systems have been
breached. Third, healthcare providers should be required to destroy medical records
and other data containing patient health information when the provider wishes to
discard the information. And finally, Ohio should provide a mechanism for
individuals to gain direct access to monetary awards received from healthcare
providers that violate the statute’s requirement. All of these changes will be
proactive steps in helping to prevent medical identity theft from occurring.
A. Ohio’s Data Breach Notification Law Should Apply to HIPAA Covered Entities
Ohio should amend its data breach notification statute to reach HIPAA covered
entities. As stated earlier, HIPAA does not preempt state laws that impose more
stringent requirements on covered entities. This allows states to protect their citizens
better. Ohio should take advantage of this authority for two reasons. The first reason
is that HIPAA has not been widely enforced. The second reason is that the attorney
general can bring suits under Ohio’s law and not be subject to intervention by the
DHHS Secretary.
Ohio law should cover healthcare entities because HIPAA has been poorly
enforced.177 The Office for Civil Rights178 reported that since the compliance date in

173
See id. The civil penalty under this section is only levied after the attorney general has
learned that the business “has intentionally or recklessly failed to comply with the applicable
section for more than ninety days.” Id. § 1349.192(A)(1)(c). After a court finds this, the
business may be fined up to $1,000 per day for the first 60 days of noncompliance, up to
$5,000 from day 61 to 90, and up to $10,000 for each day thereafter. Id.
174

Id. § 1349.191(B).

175

Id. § 1349.192(A)(2).

176

Id. § 1345.51.

177

California was the first state to require data breach notification and its law explicitly
addresses health care organizations. See Hamilton, supra note 40, at 30.
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April 2003, more than half of the cases were closed because they were not eligible
for enforcement.179 In Ohio alone, since 2003, 71% of all complaints were resolved
after intake and review,180 meaning that no formal investigation was ever made
before the complaint was dismissed.181 Of Ohio cases, 11% were found not to have a
violation after an investigation.182 And 17% of the cases were investigated and
resolved with a voluntary corrective action or other agreement obtained from the
covered entity.183 This is absurd considering that a recent survey found that one in
four of the 196 health organizations that responded “do not conduct a formal risk
analysis to identify security gaps in electronic patient data.”184 This is significant
because a failure to conduct risk analysis is a direct violation of HIPAA’s Security
Rule.185 Even more alarming, the survey revealed that the Department of Health and
Human Services has never penalized an organization for violating HIPAA’s data risk
analysis provision.186 By the Department of Health and Humans Service’s own
admission, there is no desire to penalize healthcare providers for these violations. As
Susan McAndrew, Deputy Director at the Department of Health and Human
Services Office for Civil Rights, said, “[T]he Agency hasn’t issued any fines because
the goal of enforcement is to nudge doctors, hospitals, and insurers into compliance,
not to punish them.”187 She also added that the Department of Health and Human
Services has no need “to evoke a penalty scheme in order to get the corrective
action.”188
Ohio should also amend its current data breach notification law to include
healthcare providers because it will make enforcement of privacy and security
178

“[T]he agency relies on media reports, complaints, and referrals from other agencies to
learn of potential HIPAA rules violations.” Joe Eaton, Patient Data Safety Rules Widely
Disregarded, Unenforced (Jan. 19, 2010), http://www.publicintegrity.org/articles/entry/1906/.
179

See Nicastro, supra note 123.

180

The resolution after intake and review can be accomplished in four ways: (1) the
violation did not occur after April 14, 2003; (2) the entity is not covered by the Privacy Rule;
(3) the complaint was not filed within 180 days and an extension was not granted; and (4) the
incident described in the complaint does not violate the Privacy Rule. U.S. Department of
Health & Human Services, Enforcement Process,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/process/index.html.
181

U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Enforcement Results by State, Dec. 31,
2009, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/data/nmtosc.html#OH.
182

Id.

183

Id.; see also U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Enforcement Process,
supra note 180.
184
Eaton, supra note 178. The study came to the conclusion that a “number of hospitals,
health clinics, and insurance firms are violating federal security rules on patient data and
putting sensitive health information at risk.” Id.
185

See 45 C.F.R. 164.308(a)(1) (2010). The purpose of the risk assessment is to assure that
patient information does not fall into the wrong hands. See generally id.
186

See Eaton, supra note 178.

187

Id.

188

Id.
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standards easier. Under HIPAA, when a state attorney general seeks to punish a
covered entity for violating one of the statute’s requirements, the attorney general
must first notify the DHHS Secretary, who may intervene in the action.189 If Ohio
were to apply its data breach notification statute directly to HIPAA covered entities,
the attorney general could bypass any possible intervention by the DHHS Secretary
and file civil suits based on violations of the Ohio statute.190
Applying Ohio law to covered entities provides a better way of enforcing data
breach notification law and makes HIPAA’s lack of enforcement virtually irrelevant
because of the adequacy of the state law.191 State laws that make enforcement of a
federal law virtually irrelevant are not unprecedented. In fact, in areas beyond data
breach there are many examples of state regulations being more effective than
federal regulations.192 For example, Congress has delegated the entire regulation and
taxation of the insurance industry to the states.193 Furthermore, “one of federalism’s
chief virtues . . . is that it promotes innovation by allowing for the possibility that ‘a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try
189

See HITECH Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13410(e)(1), 123 Stat. 115, 274 (2009).

190

In other regulatory schemes, federal regulation agencies do not have the power to
intervene. For example, in the field of environmental regulation, while notice is given, the
Environmental Protection Agency cannot intervene in an action. See 40 C.F.R. § 254.2. The
regulation provides no indication that the Environmental Protection Agency can intervene in a
civil action brought by a citizen or state attorney general. For example, the regulation states,
“[A] copy of the notice shall be mailed to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, The Regional Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency for the region
in which the violation is alleged to have occurred, and the chief administrative officer of the
solid waste management agency for the State in which the violation is alleged to have
occurred” Id. § 254.2(a)(1).
191

There is a school of thought that feels that a federal law addressing data breach is
unnecessary because state laws are adequate. See Samuel Lee, Breach Notification Laws:
Notification Requirements and Data Safeguarding Now Apply to Everyone, Including
Entrepreneurs, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J. 125, 142 (2006).
192

Examining the Financial Services Industry’s Responsibilities and Role in Preventing
Identity Theft and Protecting Sensitive Financial Information: Before the S. Comm. On
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 728 (2005) (Statement of Edmund
Mierzwinski, Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group). A few
examples of state privacy leadership:
•

“[F]orty states had already enacted ‘do not call lists’ before the Federal Trade
Commission acted in 2003 to establish a national list.

•

Seven states enacted free credit report on request laws before Congress enacted
one in the 2003 [Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act].

•

Over a dozen states enacted laws requiring the truncation of credit card
numbers on consumer receipts before the provision was made nationwide in the
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act.”

Id.
193
See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2008). The Act provides that the
“business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the
several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.” Id. § 1012(a).
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novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.’”194 It
is under this backdrop that Ohio should take the first step and mandate that its data
breach notification apply to healthcare providers.
If Ohio were to amend its data breach notification law to reach HIPAA covered
entities, there are concerns that amending the state law would be unproductive.
Opponents to the amendment may argue that the federal law, HIPAA, should
completely preempt state data breach notification laws.195 The conclusion reached by
this school of thought is that data security is a “distinct federal responsibility that
requires a targeted federal legislative and regulatory response.”196 This school of
thought argues that the federal government should control this because notification
requirements differ from state to state and not all states provide protections to
organizations that try to protect personal information through encryption.197
Additional support for this position is that a central regulatory authority enforcing a
single law is much better than various state attorneys general enforcing their own
state laws because of the difficulty in understanding which conflicting law controls
in a given situation.198
Supporters of a single federal act that would preempt all state laws on the subject
note that one central federal regulatory system would better address the needs of the
consumers and HIPAA covered entities. The argument is that state laws are too
consumer based because the laws require disclosure based on the residency of the
194

See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Conner, J., dissenting) (quoting New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
195

See Lee, supra note 191, at 142.

196

See Examining the Financial Services Industry’s Responsibilities and Role in
Preventing Identity Theft and Protecting Sensitive Financial Information: Before the S.
Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 728 (2005) (Statement of Ira D.
Hammerman, Senior Vice President and General Counsel to the Securities Industry
Association). Ira D. Hammerman urged the Senate to adopt the following assertions in
establishing a national data breach notification law that would preempt all state laws:
1.

“A clear national standard to achieve a uniform, consistent approach that meets
consumer expectation;

2.

Trigger for consumer notice tied to significant risk of harm or injury that might
result in identity theft;

3.

A precise definition of sensitive personal information tied to the risk of identity
theft;

4.

Exclusive functional regulator oversight and rulemaking authority;

5.

Flexible notification provisions; and

6.

Reasonable administrative compliance obligations.”

Id.
197

See Jaikumar Vijayan, Three More States Add Laws on Data Breaches, Computerworld
(Jan. 6, 2006),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/107574/Three_More_States_Add_Laws_on_Data_B
reaches.
198

See id. The difference in state laws is likely to exacerbate the confusion and potential
harm to customers. See Mierzwinski, supra note 192.
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consumer, rather than the location where the breach occurred. This means that when
a covered entity incurs a data breach, it must comply with the state law of each of its
affected consumers.199 This could easily range from a few different state laws to
dozens of state laws depending on the size of the covered entity’s personal
information database. In essence, supporters of a single federal law support a central
regulatory and enforcement body because it would have the expertise to adjust
privacy protections over time as threat levels change and the industry’s ability to
respond to data breaches evolves.200
Finally, supporters of one national law argue that because evidence is lacking on
the effectiveness of data breach notification statutes in preventing general identity
theft,201 extension of Ohio’s law to covered entities may not decrease instances of
medical identity theft. A study showed that the passage of data breach notification
laws reduced the identity theft rate by less than 6.1 percent on average.202 Healthcare
providers and the legislature fear that extending Ohio’s law to covered entities may
not effectively prevent cases of medical identity theft, but rather impede e-commerce
and stifle technological development by discouraging healthcare providers from
innovation using consumers’ personal health information.203
The concerns of those desiring a national regulatory scheme are outweighed for
the reasons stated earlier. Additionally, breach notification statutes provide “an
incentive for companies to improve security controls and [allow] consumers to make
informed decisions about their individually identifiable information.”204
Furthermore, there is no telling how effective the HIPAA amendments through the
HITECH Act will be. It is too soon to tell if the new data breach notification laws
199

See Romanosky et. al., supra note 23, at 7.

200

See Mierzwinski, supra note 192.

201

See Romanosky et. al., supra note 21, at 3. “To date, no empirical analysis has
investigated the effectiveness of such legislative initiatives in reducing identity theft.” Id. at 3.
202

Id. at 2. By the study’s own admission, the quality of data and the possibility of
sampling bias also potentially affected the information. See id. However, the argument gains
support through comparison to other laws enacted to combat certain behavior. For example,
state laws banning the use of handheld devices to make calls or send text messages while
driving have not resulted in fewer vehicle crashes, despite the fact that six states and the
District of Columbia ban talking on a hand-held device, and 19 states and the District of
Columbia ban texting while driving. See generally Distracted Driving Laws Don’t Stop
Crashes, Study Shows, Associated Press, Jan. 29, 2010, available at
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2010/01/distracted_driving_laws_dont_s.html.
The article concludes that the survey leaves more questions than answers because the data did
not definitively determine why the laws have not decreased the number of accidents. Id. Much
like the purpose of data breach notification statutes, these bans are designed to prevent an
event from occurring other than the subject matter that the law directly addresses. These bans
on activities while driving are designed to prevent accidents, and the data breach regulations
are designed to prevent occurrences of identity theft. Comparing the results of legislation in
both areas will be helpful in determining their overall effectiveness.
203
204

Romanosky et. al., supra note 23, at 2.

Hamilton, supra note 40, at 31; Romanosky et. al., supra note 23, at 2. “Notifications
can also enable law enforcement, researchers, and policy makers to better understand which
firms and sectors are best [or worst] at protecting consumer and employee data.” Romanosky
et. al., supra note 23, at 2.
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will be enforced any differently than the existing HIPAA requirements. Industry
commentators have observed, “[W]ith so little proactive intervention by the federal
government to date, covered entities have no incentive to take the threat of civil or
criminal penalties [introduced through the HITECH Act] seriously.”205 Moreover,
even if the state laws provide only an ounce of incentive to prevent medical identity
theft from occurring, it is worth a pound of cure.206
B. Ohio’s Data Breach Notification Law Should Have an Acquisition-Based Trigger
Ohio should amend its data breach notification statute by replacing its risk-based
trigger with an acquisition-based trigger. State data breach notification laws can be
defined by their trigger. The trigger is the event that requires the organization to
notify its customers that a data breach occurred.207 States differ on the event that
triggers organizations to notify consumers of a data breach.208 There are two types of
triggers: acquisition-based triggers and risk-based triggers. Acquisition-based
triggers require consumer notification whenever personal data is reasonably believed
to have been acquired by an unauthorized person and require no evidence that an
unauthorized person actually acquired the data.209 On the other hand, “[r]isk-based
triggers allow for a risk assessment to determine whether any harm has or will be
done to those whose records were potentially breached.”210 With risk-based triggers,
notification is only necessary where the potential for harm exists.211
Ohio should adopt an acquisition-based trigger like California’s statute because
an acquisition-based trigger puts consumers on notice that an unauthorized
individual has accessed their personal information. This is the better model for
consumers because under the risk-based trigger, consumers are not notified when an
organization cannot determine who accessed consumer information and why.212 In
other words, under the risk-based trigger, a business whose security has been
breached has no duty to notify consumers if it does not know how the information is,
205
Tobi M. Murphy, Comment: Enforcement of the HIPAA Privacy Rule: Moving From
Illusory Voluntary Compliance to Continuous Compliance Through Private Accreditation, 54
LOY. L. REV. 155, 182 (2008).
206

See David Harlow, HIPAA Enforcement by State Attorneys General: The Shape of
Things to Come (Jan. 14, 2010), http://healthblawg.typepad.com/healthblawg/2010/01/hipaaenforcement-by-state-attorneys-general-the-shape-of-things-to-come.html.
207

Julie A. Heitzenrater, Identity and Data Loss: Data Breach Notification Legislation:
Recent Developments, 4 I/S: A J.L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 661, 663 (2009).
208

Michael E. Jones, Privacy on the Internet and in Organizational Database: Data
Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private Sectors, 3 I/S: A J. L. & POL’Y FOR
THE INFO. SOC’Y 555, 561-62 (2007).
209

Heitzenrater, supra note 207, at 663-64. This type of trigger is used in about half the
states that have data breach notification statutes. Jones, supra note 208, at 562.
210

Heitzenrater, supra note 207, at 664.

211

Id.

212

Examining the Financial Services Industry’s Responsibilities and Role in Preventing
Identity Theft and Protecting Sensitive Financial Information: Before the S. Comm. On
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, supra note 192 (Statement of Edmund Mierzwinski,
Consumer Program Director, U.S. Public Interest Research Group).
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or might be used by an unauthorized user.213 This leaves the burden of uncertainty on
consumers, by virtually leaving them in the dark.214 This burden can be extremely
severe as it pertains to medical identity theft because unlike regular identity theft,
there is no guarantee that the consumer will even find out about the medical identity
theft. Even if the consumer finds out about it, there is no central repository of
information where the consumer can call and get matter corrected. Additionally,
risk-based triggers are not useful in preventing medical identity theft because they
allow companies, which have an interest in keeping data breaches secret, to decide if
notice is required.215 The acquisition-based trigger provides an incentive for
businesses to invest more in data security because they know they are obligated to
notify consumers of every data breach.216
The opposition to acquisition-based triggers argues that too much reporting will
lead to consumer apathy about the risk of medical identity theft.217 The purpose is to
ensure that notification is always linked to some sort of demonstrable risk of harm to
the customer.218 Furthermore, the risk-based trigger considers the interests of the
businesses responsible for notification219 because it allows the organization to
consider the cost of breach notification and the actual likelihood that the breached
information will be used to harm the individual. An acquisition-based trigger would
increase overhead costs because healthcare providers would be forced to notify the
public any time a data breach occurred.
213

Id.

214

Id.

215

Id. at 10.

216

Id.

217

Id. This allows companies to unilaterally issue notifications whenever they feel
disclosure is appropriate. Id.
218
Examining the Financial Services Industry’s Responsibilities and Role in Preventing
Identity Theft and Protecting Sensitive Financial Information: Before the S. Comm. On
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, supra note 192 (Statement of Ira D. Hammerman,
Senior V.P. and Gen. Counsel, Sec. Indus. Ass’n.).
219

It is yet to be seen how the United States Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission will play out in the area of healthcare legislation. See generally
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). It is very possible that
healthcare lobbyists will be able to persuade legislators, at the federal and state level, for more
favorable laws and regulations. See generally The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N. Y. TIMES
EDITORIAL (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/opinion/22fri1.html.
Healthcare lobbyists may be able to persuade legislators like never before because the
decision in Citizens United struck down decades-old limitations on corporate political
expenditures by permitting businesses and unions to spend freely on commercials for or
against candidates. See Jess Bravin, Court Kills Limits on Corporate Politicking, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 22, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703699204575016942930090152.html.
President Obama called the decision, “[a] major victory for big oil, Wall Street banks, Health
insurance companies and other powerful interests that marshal their power every day in
Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans.” Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4,
Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22scotus.html (emphasis added).
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While these concerns to the corporate welfare are important, they fail to address
the fact that corporations have a duty to protect the consumer information that they
possess. Based on the number of data breaches occurring every year, it is undisputed
that healthcare providers and other organizations are simply incapable of protecting
information. This inability puts patients and consumers at risk. At the very least,
healthcare providers should be required to inform patients when information systems
are breached. Additionally, the term “risk-based trigger” is somewhat of an
oxymoron because corporations are incapable of truly determining when and how an
unauthorized user of consumer information is going to do with that information. It is
very common for a hacker to steal personal information from an organization and
wait months or even years before attempting to use the stolen information.220 The
bottom line is that consumers have the right to know when an organization they
trusted has failed to safeguard their personal information. Customers also have the
right to decide what course of action they will take to protect themselves from
potential medical identity theft attempts. Healthcare providers and other businesses,
which have a vested interest in not notifying customers and are incapable of
determining what an unauthorized person will do with customers’ information,
should not be able to take these rights away.
C. Ohio’s Data Breach Notification Law Should Require Healthcare Providers to
Destroy or Encrypt Discarded Medical Records
Ohio should amend its data breach notification statute to require covered entities
to destroy data that the entity wants to dispose of.221 This requirement is important
because careless document disposal is the leading way for identity thieves to get
personal information.222 In fact, only 12% of identity theft is perpetrated online.223
For example, a fourth-grade schoolteacher in Salt Lake City purchased scrap paper
for her students that turned out to be medical records of twenty-eight patients.224
Included in the records that were inadvertently sold as surplus paper were the
medical history, personal contact information, insurance information, and social
security numbers for each patient.225 This example is merely illustrative of the vast
220

Darrow & Lichtenstein, supra, note 20, at 25.

221

Ohio’s statute establishes a safe harbor for information that is encrypted. See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1349.19(A)(7)(a) (LexisNexis 2010). No state requires corporations to provide
notification of a data breach if the compromised information is encrypted. See Bruce E. H.
Johnson et al., Data Breach Notice Legislation: New Technologies and New Privacy Duties?,
865 PLI/PAT 203, 216 (2006). This creates a safe harbor for corporations to avoid data breach
notification requirements by encrypting all electronic consumer information. Id.
222

Lisa Black & John Keilman. Paper Trail: Personal Data Found Blowing in the Wind
(Jan. 30, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-01-30/news/1001300085_1_socialsecurity-documents-paperwork/2; see also Better Business Bureau, Spring-Cleaning? Prevent
ID Theft by Following BBB Advice on What to Keep and What to Shred, (Apr. 2, 2008),
http://www.bbb.org/us/article/spring-cleaning-prevent-id-theft-by-following-bbb-advice-onwhat-to-keep-and-what-to-shred-4149.
223

See Better Business Bureau, supra note 222.

224

See Medical Records Sold to Teacher as Scrap Paper, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 10, 2008),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23561667/?GT1=43001.
225

Id.
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majority of identity theft cases that occur when the thief has direct contact with the
victim’s personal information through a stolen or lost wallet, or by rifling through
the victim’s mailbox or trash.226 This means that an effective and proactive way to
prevent medial identity theft even before it happens is to properly destroy data
containing personal information when it is no longer useful.227
Ohio should implement one of two types of data destruction laws. The first
option is a data destruction law that specifically enumerates how the data must be
destroyed.228 California, for example, requires businesses to destroy customers’
records that are no longer being maintained.229 The provision states that:
A business shall take all reasonable steps to dispose, or arrange for the
disposal of customer records within its custody or control containing
personal information when the records are no longer to be retained by the
business by shredding, erasing, or otherwise modifying the personal
information in those records to make it unreadable or undecipherable
through any means.230
226
See id. Identity thieves often dumpster dive or look through trash for private information
that can be harvested and used for unlawful purposes. See New York State Consumer
Protection Board, Shred the Word! To Prevent Identity Theft at a Free Public Shredding Day
in Amsterdam, NY (Sept. 21, 2009),
http://www.consumer.state.ny.us/pressreleases/2009/sept212009.htm.
227

See generally Better Business Bureau, supra note 222.

228

States that have passed this type of law include Arkansas, California, Georgia, Indiana,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode
Island, Texas, Vermont. See Scott & Scott LLP, Data Destruction Law (Business and
Technology Law) (Oct. 5, 2007),
http://blawg.scottandscottllp.com/businessandtechnologylaw/2007/10/data_destruction_laws.h
tml.
229

Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2009).

230

CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81 (West 2010). California is not the only state that has the
disposal requirement. For example, Colorado’s law states: “Each public and private entity in
the state that uses documents during the course of business that contain personal identifying
information shall develop a policy for the destruction or proper disposal of paper documents
containing personal identifying information.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-713(1) (2010).
Additionally, New York has a similar provision:
No person, business, firm, partnership, association, or corporation, not including the
state or its political subdivisions, shall dispose of a record containing personal
identifying information unless the person, business, firm, partnership, association, or
corporation, or other person under contract with the business, firm, partnership,
association, or corporation does any of the following: (a) shreds the record before the
disposal of the record; or (b) destroys the personal identifying information contained
in the record; or (c) modifies the record to make the personal identifying information
unreadable; or (d) takes actions consistent with commonly accepted industry practices
that it reasonably believes will ensure that no unauthorized person will have access to
the personal identifying information contained in the record. Provided, however, that
an individual person shall not be required to comply with this subdivision unless he or
she is conducting business for profit.
NY GEN. BUS. § 399-h (McKinney 2010).
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The other type of data destruction simply mandates the use of a disposal system
that meets a reasonableness standard.231 Maryland’s law, for example, states that:
[W]hen a business is destroying a customer’s records that contain
personal information of the customer,232 the business shall take reasonable
steps to protect against unauthorized access to or use of the personal
information, taking into account: (1) The sensitivity of the records; (2)
The nature and size of the business and its operations; (3) The costs and
benefits of different destruction methods; and (4) Available technology.233
Regardless of which form of data destruction law the Ohio adopts, there is
considerable value in requiring firms to destroy unwanted medical information. As
Better Business Bureau CEO Director Michelle Corey stated, “[s]tudies show that
most thieves obtain personal information through trash cans or unsecured places in
the home or office, and the easiest way to protect identity is to shred personal
documents.”234
D. Ohio’s Data Breach Notification Law Should Be Amended to Give Residents a
Method of Recovering Monetary Awards Against Covered Entities That Violate
Ohio’s Law
Ohio’s data breach law should be amended to give citizens some mechanism to
recover monetary awards when a business violates the law and the citizen is injured
as a result of the violation. The mechanism to recover should be either a civil action
brought directly by the citizen against the healthcare provider or a civil action
brought by the attorney general entitling a citizen harmed by the statutory violation
to a portion of the monetary penalty.235
Ohio residents should be able to bring private lawsuits under the amended
statute. There are a number of states that allow private causes of action under their
data breach notification statutes.236 These civil actions provide an incentive for
231
States that have adopted this form of record destruction include: Arkansas, Colorado,
Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. See Scott & Scott
LLP, supra note 228.
232

Customer means an individual residing in the State who provides personal information
to a business for the purpose of purchasing or leasing a product or obtaining a service from the
business. MD. CODE ANN., COM-LAW § 14-3502(a) (LexisNexis 2010).
233

MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW. 14-3502(b) (LexisNexis 2009).

234

Press Release, Ill. Att’y Gen. Lisa Madigan, Madigan Co-Sponsors “Shred Day” to
Help Eliminate ID Theft (Mar. 29, 2006),
http://www.ag.state.il.us/pressroom/2006_03/20060329.html.
235
For example, if a healthcare provider does not notify an individual that their personal
information was accessed in a breach, and as a result of that breach the citizen’s medical
identity is stolen, the person should be able to recover from the healthcare provider who
violated the statute.
236

In the District of Columbia, “[a]ny District of Columbia resident injured by a violation
of this subchapter may institute a civil action to recover actual damages, the costs of the
action, and reasonable attorney's fees.” D.C. CODE § 28-3853(a) (2010). “Actual damages
shall not include dignitary damages, including pain and suffering.” Id. In Louisiana, “[a] civil
action may be instituted to recover actual damages resulting from the failure to disclose in a
timely manner to a person that there has been a breach of the security system resulting in the
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corporations to comply with data breach laws by exposing them to financial
penalties.237 The result is that many corporations have strengthened their compliance
programs to reduce the potential for violations.238
As displayed in other areas of regulation, specifically environmental protection,
civil actions are effective tools in enforcing statutory requirements. In environmental
regulation, “no program of environmental protection is better than its enforcement
system.”239 A primary concern of environmentally regulated entities is avoiding
liability.240 Under the environmental regulation system, companies are potentially
liable to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), state regulatory agencies, and
private citizens,241 who can bring toxic tort, nuisance, or other types of actions
against the business.242 The EPA enforcement policy, for instance, calls for penalties
equal to the economic benefit the violator enjoyed, multiplied by a gravity

disclosure of a person's personal information.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 51:3075 (2010). In
Tennessee, “[a]ny customer of an information holder who is a person or business entity, but
who is not an agency of the state or any political subdivision of the state, and who is injured
by a violation of this section, may institute a civil action to recover damages and to enjoin the
person or business entity from further action in violation of this section.” TENN. CODE ANN. §
47-18-2107(h) (2009). “The rights and remedies available under this section are cumulative to
each other and to any other rights and remedies available under law.” Id.
237

See generally John S. Moot, Compliance Programs, Penalty Mitigation and the FERC,
29 ENERGY L. J. 547 (2008).
238
See id. Generally, a duty-based liability induces firms to undertake optimal policing
measures such as monitoring, investigating, and reporting. Jennifer Arlen & Reiner
Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes,
72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 694 (1997). However, it presents weaker incentives to adopt
preventative measures because of the difficulty of determining ex post whether the duty has
been met. Id. at 705.
239
Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation,
Capture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 81, 82 (2002). Most regulatory agencies
prefer to work informally with violators: bargaining with them or helping them reach
voluntary compliance rather than punishing their noncompliance in formal administrative or
judicial actions to deter future violations. Id. at 83. Each citizen suit is an opportunity for
oversight of the regulatory enforcement process. Id. at 84.
240
See Allison F. Gardner, Beyond Compliance: Regulatory Incentives to Implement
Environmental Management Systems, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 662, 668 (2003).
241

Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Section 7002, citizens are
authorized to bring enforcement actions against potential or actual violators and against the
Environmental Protection Agency in federal district court. RCRA Enforcement Process and
Authorities, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/oecaearth/civil/rcra/rcraenfprocess.html (last updated May 18, 2010).
242

40 C.F.R. 254.1 (2010). “The Solid Waste Disposal Act . . . authorizes suit by any
person to enforce the Act.” Id. These suits may be brought where there is alleged to be a
violation by any person of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order
which has become effective under the Act, or a failure of the Administrator to perform any act
or duty under the Act, which is not discretionary with the Administrator. Id. These actions are
to be filed in accordance with the rules of the district court in which the action is instituted. Id.
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component based on the severity and blameworthiness of the violation.243 There are
clear indicators that adversarial enforcement of environmental regulations
discourages targeted regulated entities from violating the law.244 While cooperative
enforcement, which eschews penalties altogether, results in a minimal material
incentive for companies to avoid noncompliance.245
In addition to the incentive that private lawsuits would give healthcare providers
to comply with Ohio’s data breach notification law, Ohio residents need a cause of
action under the amended statute because common law suits with regard to data
breaches have been widely unsuccessful.246 Ohio, like other states, provides for
administrative enforcement of its data security law but does not bar relevant
common law causes of action by private citizens.247 While the statute allows for
common law actions, it does not allow a citizen to use the statute itself as a source
for duty or liability in civil cases.248 Many lawsuits have emerged in the last decade
from citizens filing common law civil actions seeking damages from businesses that
lost their personal information. While all of these suits have involved data breaches
and regular identity theft, they provide insight into how courts will likely deal with
future common law actions concerning medical identity theft.
Generally, when citizens bring a lawsuit, it is under one of three causes of action:
breach of contract, negligence, or breach of fiduciary duty.249 It has been suggested
243

See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Policy on Civil Penalties (Feb. 16, 1984), available in 17
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,083 (1987). The adversarial approach’s goal is to establish a
credible punitive response that produces specific and general deterrence through the
systematic imposition of penalties. See Zinn, supra note 239, at 88. Imposing penalties
eliminates the economic benefit a firm derives from noncompliance and makes
noncompliance more expensive than compliance. See id.
244

See id. at 96.

245

See id. at 97.

246

See generally Key v. DSW Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Ohio 2006). The court
determined that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue. See id. The class action lawsuit failed
because the court noted that any named plaintiffs, who represent a class, must allege and show
that they personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by another,
unidentified member of the class to which they belong and which they purport to represent. Id.
at 687. The complaint failed because the plaintiff did not personally experience any injury
other than an increased risk of identity theft or other related financial crimes. Id. at 688.
Furthermore, the plaintiff lacked standing because the alleged injury is dependent upon the
perceived risk of future actions of third parties that were not before the court. Id. at 689.
247

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.192(A)(1)(c) (West 2010). “The rights and remedies
that are provided under this section are in addition to any other rights or remedies that are
provided by law.” REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.192(C) (West 2010). The first major hurdle that
potential plaintiffs need to overcome is to show that they have standing to sue in the first
place. To have standing a plaintiff must meet three requirements. See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). First, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered
an injury in fact, which is actual, concrete, and particularized. Id. Second, the plaintiff must
show a causal connection between the conduct complained of and the injury. Id. Finally, the
plaintiff must establish that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id.
248
249

See Pinson, supra note 22, at 41.

An underlying theme that evolves from all the cases that deal with this topic is that
injury is an extremely difficult element to prove. Often times, plaintiffs advance the cost of
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that the breach of contract is the best basis to bring a data breach claim; however,
this cause of action almost always leaves victims with little or no recourse.250 This is
because it is difficult, if not impossible to discover, let alone prove with a legal
certainty, which organization was responsible for losing the personal information
that caused the identity theft.251 Additionally, compensable damages are an element
of a breach of contract cause of action and these can also be very difficult to
establish in an identity theft context.252
Citizens seeking recovery under a negligence theory are also unlikely to receive
favorable rulings. In a negligence action, a plaintiff must prove the following
elements to recover damages: (1) existence of a legal duty; (2) breach of that duty;
(3) causation of harm due to the breach; and (4) resulting damages.253 The biggest
hurdle in making a prima facie case for negligence is proving that the individual has
been harmed. Courts have held that time spent correcting a case of identity theft, the
increased threat of identity theft,254 and the cost of credit monitoring systems255 are
not compensable injuries. Causation may also be equally difficult to prove.256
credit monitoring as an injury. They also assert that the cost of future monitoring is an injury
that deserves compensation. Courts often reject these arguments by comparing future health
monitoring in the toxic tort context and future financial health monitoring in the data breach
context. For example, in Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, the court noted that
future health monitoring is as sufficient injury because it necessarily and directly involves
human health and safety and credit monitoring cases do not. Stollenwerk v. Tri-West
Healthcare Alliance, 2005 WL 2465906, at 4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2005). It is this public health
interest that justifies departure from the general rule that enhanced future risk of injury cannot
form the sole basis for a negligence action. See Amfrac Distrib. Corp. v Miller, 673 P.2d 792,
793-94 (Ariz. 1983). As a side note, courts may consider an exception with regard to the
effects of medical identity theft; however, this theory is untested in the medical identity theft
context.
250

Darrow & Lichtenstein, supra note 20, at 28.

251

See Kathryn E. Picanso, Protecting Information Security under a Uniform Data Breach
Notification Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 355, 377 (2006); see also Bell v. Acxiom Corp., 2006
U.S. Dist. Lexis 72477 *10 (E. D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006) (plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed
because the plaintiff did not know whether her name and information was contained within
the databases stolen).
252
See McCalment v. Eli Lilly & Co., 860 N.E. 2d 884, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). For
example, in Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp, the plaintiffs could not recover on their breach
of contract claim because of their failure to establish compensable damages. See Pisciotta v.
Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 639-40 (7th Cir. 2007). The court noted that without more
than allegations of increased risk of future identity theft, the plaintiffs had not suffered a harm
that the law was prepared to remedy. Id. at 639.
253
Nye v. CSX Transp., Inc., 437 F.3d 556, 563 (6th Cir. 2006). The threat of future harm,
not yet realized, will not satisfy the damage requirement. Guin v. Brazos Higher Educ. Serv.
Corp., 2006 WL 288483 at 5 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2006). The defendant’s motion for summary
judgment was granted in the case because the plaintiff failed to show that he himself was
victim of identity theft or some other fraud. Id. at 5-6. The court held that the negligence
action could not be sustained. Id.
254
In the identity theft context, courts have embraced the general rule that an alleged
increase in risk of future injury is not an actual or imminent injury. Consequently, courts have
held that plaintiffs lack standing, or have granted summary judgment for failure to establish
damages in cases involving identity theft or claims of negligence and breach of confidentiality
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Breach of fiduciary duty has not provided a viable cause of action for victims
either. For a breach of fiduciary duty claim to be effective, the victim must prove
that entrusting the data collector with personal information creates a quasi-fiduciary
relationship that is more similar to an agency relationship than to an arm’s length
relationship.257 As a fiduciary, it could be argued that the data collector assumed the
duty to act for the benefit of the consumer with respect to matters within the scope of
the relationship.258 This duty includes the duties of loyalty, trust, and
confidentiality.259 This cause of action is largely untested and there is room for
further consideration.260 However, when the cause of action is used, the plaintiff still
must establish an injury, which, as already discussed, can be extremely difficult.261
While is it clear that most common law civil actions with regard to data breach
fail because the plaintiff cannot prove damages, there will be cases where the
plaintiff is a victim of medical identity theft and can prove damages. When a suit
like this arises, rather than leaving the damages award up to a jury based on a
common law action, the more reasonable approach would be to allow individual
citizens to sue under the Ohio data breach notification statute. Like California’s
statute,262 Ohio’s statute could set the monetary penalties to be awarded to a plaintiff
brought in response to a third party theft or unlawful access to financial information from a
financial institution. Key, 454 F. Supp. 2d, at 689; see Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., 2006 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 52266 at 1 (D. N.J. July 31, 2006).
255
The cost of measures to avoid identity theft fraud, courts typically have found these
efforts not to be harms themselves, but merely voluntary actions taken in anticipation of
potential harm. James Graves, “Medical” Monitoring for Non-medical Harms: Evaluating the
Reasonable Necessity of Measurers to Avoid Identity Fraud After a Data Breach, 16 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 2, 8 (2009). In other contexts medical monitoring damages allow recovery of
costs of medical tests designed to detect and prevent the onset of diseases resulting from the
defendant’s actions. Id. at 12. Plaintiffs have sought damages for the cost of monitoring the
long-term effects of physical injuries, pharmaceuticals, tobacco, insecticides, asbestos, and
other harmful substances. Id. Courts are reluctant to extend this judicial principal to nonphysical injuries. Id. at 27.
256

One court noted that as a requirement to a negligence action, the plaintiff must show
that there is evidence that the thieves or other unauthorized individuals were able to access the
information or if accessed that it would be used for unlawful purposes. See Kahle v. Litton
Loan Servicing LP, 486 F. Supp. 2d 705, 712-13 (S. D. Ohio 2007). This shows that the
plaintiff must know, and prove legal certainty, which organization lost the information and the
unlawful purposes the information was in. See id.
257

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006).

258

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1979).

259

See id.

260

See generally Brandon Faulkner, Hacking into Data Breach Notification Laws, 59 FLA.
L. REV. 1097, 1122 (2007).
261

Shafran v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22494, 8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24,
2008) (plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty among other causes of action failed for failure to
show damages).
262

In California, a private citizen can file suit “for a willful, intentional, or reckless
violation” of California’s data breach statute and recover a civil penalty up to $3,000 per
violation. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(c) (West 2009). The citizen may also sue to enjoin
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who brings a successful action. Lawsuits under the statute are the best for both
parties. Healthcare providers are protected because a victim must still have standing
to bring suit and the maximum potential award the provider would be responsible for
is already set. Consumers are protected because they would have direct access to
monetary recovery from a healthcare provider and the statute provides the standard
of care to show that the healthcare provider acted either negligently or willfully.
Even if Ohio does not allow for private civil actions under the statute, it should
allow Ohio residents to access the awards earned by the Ohio Attorney General
through suits brought under the Ohio amended data breach notification law and
HIPAA. Under Ohio’s current law, the attorney general has the exclusive authority
to bring a civil action in a court of common pleas.263 Even though an individual may
have filed the complaint with the Ohio attorney general that provided the basis to file
suit, the current statute does not provide that individual access to the civil award.
Ohio should adopt a policy similar to the plan articulated in the HITECH Act,264
where citizens receive a portion of the penalties received as a result of their
complaint to the attorney general. This access to attorney general monetary
recoveries is important because it is extremely difficult for an individual citizen to
bring a successful private action. Additionally, some financial injuries to certain
medical identity theft victims may be so small that the cost of a lawsuit may make
litigation unfavorable. When the attorney general files lawsuits on behalf of similarly
situated individuals, those individuals should have direct access to the awards to
compensate for their injuries, no matter how small. After all, the role of the Ohio
Attorney General is not to make money exclusively for his own office. His role is to
“protect Ohio families from predatory financial practices through [its] enforcement
authority in the areas of consumer protection, antitrust, charitable organizations, and
health care fraud.”265
Amending the statute to allow Ohio residents access to monetary recovery does
raise concerns about the effect it will have on healthcare providers. These entities
already spend money on data breach prevention and data breach remediation. The
remediation costs include printing and postage of notification letters, hiring a law
firm to address legal issues, offering credit monitoring subscriptions to customers,

any business that violates or proposes to violate the statute. See id. § 1798.84(e). When the
citizen wins the lawsuit, he is entitled to recover his or her reasonable attorney's fees and
costs. See id. § 1798.84(g).
263
See Richard Cordray, Security Breaches and Compromise of Personal Information For
Ohio Businesses, OHIO ATT’Y GEN. (2009),
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/files/Publications/Publications-for-Victims/IdentityTheft-Information/Business-Breach. If it appears that a person has failed or is failing to
comply with the Act’s requirements, a court, upon a finding of such failure, should impose a
civil penalty of a specified amount per day for each day the person fails to comply with the
Act. Id
264

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13410(a), 123
Stat. 115 (2009).
265

OHIO ATTORNEY GEN., About the Ohio Attorney General, OHIO ATT’Y GEN.,
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/getattachment/aa8e59f3-6ecc-485f-b8fea344821d06a5/About-the-AG-Brochure.aspx (last visited February 16, 2010) (emphasis
added).
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customer defections,266 and implementing a customer support hotline.267 Healthcare
providers may argue that being subjected to additional litigation imposes too much
of a cost. However, the purpose of data breach notification statutes is to increase the
standards of data security and ensure notice to the public when these systems are
breached. Litigation simply sheds light on contested administrative practices and
decisions, bringing such practices to the attention of legislative oversight.268
In opposition to further consumer access to monetary penalties for statutory
violations, companies also offer an alternative to adversarial enforcement. The
alternative is that firms may use self-regulated notifications as a market
differentiator.269 In other words, if data breach notification is important to
consumers, the market will respond accordingly favoring firms with stricter
notification policies.270 As an alternative, voluntary compliance can be very effective
with providers who are motivated to establish adequate data breach systems because
this strategy seeks to avoid conflict and reduces the cost associated with
enforcement.271 Unfortunately, this plan fails to address a major concern in the fight
against data breaches. It offers no solution for less-motivated providers where
voluntary compliance schemes without penalties can result in a lack of corporate
commitment to comply with the privacy standards putting consumers at risk.272 This
purely economic model should be rejected because it provides no regulatory
authority to the state government, which has an interest in protecting its citizens.
VI. CONCLUSION
Time will tell if HIPAA’s 2009 amendments will provide the incentive covered
entities need to protect personal health information better. However, time is a
commodity that patients and consumers don’t have. Every day, there are more and
more victims of medical identity theft. This note in no way, shape, or form
266

Customer defection means losing business. See Total Quality Management, Customer
Focus and Satisfaction, September 12, 2008,
http://totalqualitymanagement.wordpress.com/2008/09/12/customer-focus-and-satisfaction/.
It occurs when unhappy customers decide to stop hiring a company or purchasing a
company’s services or products. See id. Customers also decide to find some other suitable
alternative that satisfies their needs. Id.
267

Robert Westervelt, Survey: Data Breach Costs Surge (Oct. 31, 2006),
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid14_gci1227119,00.html. The
study consisted of 31 companies and each company revealed losses ranging from less than $1
million to more than $22 million in 2006 because of data breaches. The survey noted that
costs can be “borne primarily by marketing to avoid customer turnover and customer
support.” Id.
268

See Harold J Krent, Explaining One-Way Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2047
(1993). “Most individuals will bring suit only when they can expect to receive relief sufficient
to compensate them for the expense and risk of litigation.” Id. at 2048. “Litigation to enforce
statutory and constitutional rights may benefit a wide swath of society, even when the stakes
for any one individual are too small to prompt suit. Id.
269

See Romanosky et. al., supra note 23, at 3.

270

See id.

271

See Murphy, supra note 205, at 184-85.

272

See id. at 185.
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encourages Ohio’s legislature to jump haphazardly into creating statutes to give the
appearance that it cares about the privacy of its resident’s health information.
However, the legislature should strongly consider all of the interests involved and
conduct further research to determine the best proactive course of action. After all,
Ohio’s constitution conveys that “[w]e, the people of the State of Ohio, [are] grateful
to Almighty God for our Freedom, to secure its blessings and promote our common
welfare.”273 It would be illogical to conclude that the intent of this constitutional
mandate was for the state legislature to punt its responsibilities to protect Ohio
citizens to the federal government.
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